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ASPECTS OF POST WORLD WAR II GROWTII IN
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES*
Simon Kuznets
1. Introduct ion
In this paper we deal with selected aspects of economic growth
since World War II in developin g (less developed , or LDC for short),
contraste d with developed (or DC) market economies , excluding the
centrally planned or Connnunist countries (which in 1972 accounted for
some 1.2 of 3.7 billion of world populatio n). 1

This exclusion is due

partly to difficult ies of securing comparabl e .and meaningfu l estimates
for these countries , particula rly for the giant among them, Mainland
China: but largely to problems involved in the analysis of economic
growth in countries in which the trade-off between economic gain (in
output or power) and individua l welfare and freedom is so different
from that in the less centraliz ed market economies .
The LDCs are the countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America
that are character ized by low income per capita and a productio n
structure that suggests a marked shortfall in exploitin g the opportun ities
provided by modern technolog y.

According to the World Bank Atlas, of

the 1. 85 billion people in the "developi ng" countries in 1972, close to
1 billion were in countries with an average per capita GNP of $110, and
another O. 2 7 billion were in countries with "middle income"

i.e. , a

range of per capita GNP between $200 and $375, and an average of $260.
By way of contrast the average per capita incoille for developed or
industria l
$3,500.

2

market economies , with a populatio n of 0.66 billion,w as over
United Nations estimates , a major source of comparati ve data,

*Prelimin ary draft of a paper to be presented at a conferenc e at
Vanderbi lt Universit y in late 0ctober, 1975.
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differ in detail of classification from those of the World Bank; but
for our purposes, which involve general orders of magnitude rather than
detail, the two sets of estimates are fairly comparable.
Our interest is in the growth of the poor LDCs.

Not all the

countries classified as "developing" by either the World Bank or the
United Nations are poor, the striking exception being the oil sheikdoms
with small populations and enormous oil revenues.

Nor are all the

countries classified as "developed" rich, as illustrated by several
countries in Southern Europe.

There is a twilight zone where a more

discriminating classification would place countries that are backward
but rich, those that are in the process of .movement from LDC to DC
status but have not yet attained the latter, and still others that may
have regressed from apparent DC status (possibly illustrated by Argen
tina).

But these intermediate or mixed groups do not loom large enough

within the LDC or DC categories to modify substantially the broader
parameters of size, structure, and growth - particularly when we emphasize,
as we should, the population weights in any aggregation of countries for
establishing the growth of total and per capita product for large groups.
The broad topic covers a wide field, for which, over the last
quarter of a century, an enormous body of data, both descriptive and
analytical, has accumulated.

Indeed, it is hard to exaggerate the

explosive acceleration in the flow of data and range of studies in this
field, which before World War II

was not of primary interest even for

the developed countries and practically neglected for the rest of the
world.

No single scholar can deal with it either comprehensively or with
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full balance, and particularly within the limitations of time and space
warranted on this

occasion.

The discussion that

follows represents an individual's reflections on some of the questions
raised by the broader type of aggregative evidence and analysis.
2.

Diversity and Aggregation
For the LDCs as a group, the United Nation has estimated

annual growth rates of total and per capita GDP (at constant factor
prices), from 1950 to 1972. 3

The growth rate of per capita product

was 2.5 per~~nt per year from 1950 to 1960, and 2.7 percent from 1960

•

to 1972; and the combined rate for the 22 years was 2.61 percent per
year.

If this rate were sustained, per capita product would double

in about 27 years; and the implication is that between 1950 and 1975
per capita product must have risen by about 90 percent.

For the

poorer and most populous LDC region distinguished in the UN estimates
back to 1950, East and Southeast Asia (excluding Japan), with a
population by 1972 of over 1 billion, the growth rates in per capita
product for the same two periods were 1.9 and 2.2 percent respectively,
yielding a combined rate of 2.04 percent--which implies a rise of close
to two-thirds over 25 years and a doubling in a period somewhat short
of 35 years.
Such growth rates are quite high, in the long-term historical
perspective of both the LDCs and the current DCs.

While the historical

data for the LDCs rarely provide a firm base for judging their long-term
growth, the low levels of per capita product that characterize these
countries in the early 1950s and even in the early 1960s clearly imply
that rates of growth that mean doubling in a period from 27 to 35
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years could not have prevailed in the long-term past.

For such rates,

if applied to the years before the 1950s, would have meant impossibly
low levels of per capita product and c~sumption at the beginning of
the preceding quarter of a century.

And for the current DCs, for 16

of which we have measures of long-term growth, the observed rates are
generally well below those cited for the LDCs in the paragraph above.
For periods extending from at least half a century to the long period
of their modern economic growth, Sweden, over the last century, and
Japan, back to the late 1870s, are the only two of the 16 countries
with growth rates in per capita product that approached or slightly
exceeded 29 percent per decade.

Indeed, they are the only countries

with growth rates above 22 percent per decade (unless one counts Italy,
back to 1895-99, with a rate of 23 percent).

4

If growth rates in the per capita product of LDCs over almost
a quarter of a century were so impressively high, one may ask why the
reaction to them, in the general flow of news about these countries,
in the persistent concern about critical conditions with respect to
supplies of economic goods, seem to ignore these growth achievements.
The news, reactions, concerns, are not sufficiently tangible to be
susceptible of easy quantification, and one cannot measure this state
of concern and response sufficiently to be able to see how they reflect
economic movements of the magnitude cited here.

It may well be that

a rise in expectations has produced a negative reaction to economic
attainments, which otherwise might have elicited litanies of praise
for economic "miracles."

And indeed references have been made to
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such mirac les for some limite d period s and count ries, in contra
st to
the more preva lent refere nces to acute proble ms in the LDCs,
and the
recurr ing flurri es of concer n among intern ationa l agenci es
and
develo ped countr ies over econom ic depriv ation and danger s
of collap se
in the "third " world.

Perhap s the empha sis on the flow of news on the

troubl esome rather than favora ble items in the stream of curren
t events ,
combin ed with the easier acces sibilit y and wider commu nicatio
ns,
introd uced a bias in recent decade s that tended to concea l
econom ic
advanc e of major propo rtions .

Still, even if we find, as we may later,

ground s for inferr ing that there has been a change in expec
tation s,
and hence in the bases for evalua ting the adequa cy of modern
econom ic
growth , we should still examin e critic ally aggreg ative measu
res of the
type noted above.

They may concea l more than they reveal , and the

variou s kinds of aggreg ation that yield such measu res may
contai n
biases that should be identi fied, and their magnit ude should
at least
be sugge sted.
This exami nation cannot deal with the questi on of accura cy
of
the basic underl ying data, countr y by countr y, or even for
a select ed
sample .

The questi on is partic ularly releva nt to the statis tics of

the LDCs, where the brevit y of the period over which basic
data have
been collec ted and the limite d schola rly resour ces for their
analy sis,
combin ed with the diffic ulties of proper quant ificati on of
proces ses
that do not natura lly yield measu rable result s, limit the
accura cy and
adequa cy of the data.

And part of the proble m lies in a system of

nation al accou nting concep ts and classi ficati ons which is
poorly
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fitted to the economic life and experience of the LDCs.

But, taking

note of the limitations , we assume that the basic data, while crude,
are of the right order of magnitude for broad findings and inferences- 
at least as plausible hypotheses, subject to test and revision as
better data and study lead to an improved foundation.
The measures just cited, and widely used, are results of
aggregation of: (i) populations , either within or among countries and
regions, the products of whose economic activities are pooled together;
(ii) the outputs of the several production sectors viewed as
contribution s to,

and the different uses of product viewed as

drafts upon, that common pool of product;

(iii) the movements of

total product, or its parts, in relation to population, over the
shorter periods within the total time span for which we derive the
average growth rates.

Because the measures are comprehensi ve in

their coverage of product, of the relevant populations within and
among countries, and of the different segments of the time span, the
resulting aggregat~ are effective summaries of the net result of a
wide range of interrelate d activities over a long span of historical
time.

But the synthesizin g function of such aggregation may (a) involve

sacrifice of important differences and variability ; and (b) be
attained along differing lines and with differing costs.

These two

aspects of aggregation and of the resulting measures are now briefly
discussed, with particular reference to the economic growth of the
LDCs since the early 1950s, and to the apparent puzzle set forth at the
start of this section.

7

(a) Since the growth rate of say 2.6 percent per year in per
capita GNP for 1960-72 (derived for some 67 LDC countries, each over
a million population in 1972, and omitting major oil exporters, a few
still in colonial status, and a few affected by current wars in
Indochina) is an average, it may easily be the result of a combination
of some countries with no growth and even a decline, with others having
high growth rates.

And, indeed, the World Bank Atlas, from which the

average above was derived, lists LDCs with a total population close to
100 million, with a per capita growth of less than 0.5 percent per year,
and some of them showing no rise or even decline (Bangladesh ,
Afghanistan , Senegal, for example}.
a population close to 120 million

Ghana,

At the other end, eleven LDCs with
have growth rates of 3.5 percent

per year or more, and their average (weighted by population) is 5.1
percent.

Diversity of behavior within a comprehensi ve average is only

to be expected; but this diversity in the growth records of the LDCs has
some distinctive aspects, which will be considered after a brief comment
on the implication s of aggregation among sectors and over time.
Changes in per capita gross product are combination s of
changes in per capita product of each of the~ production sectors,
appropriate ly weighted by the share of each sector in aggregate output.
The important point to note in this connection is that the growth rate
of the A sector (agriculture and related industries) has been markedly
lower than that of the I sector (industry, including mining, manufac
turing, utilities, constructio n, and transport and communicati on) and
of the S sector (services, including trade, government, professiona l,

8

and personal services).

Moreover, in relation to total population,

i.e., on a per capita basis, the growth of a basic products sector
like agriculture

has been low.

Thus, based on United Nations data

for developing countries, for 1950-72, and calculated from quinquennial
averages, the growth rate for per capita GDP over the twenty-two year
period averaged 2.3 percent per year; but for the output of the A sector
the average was only 0.56 percent per year.

5

This finding of a low

growth rate of agricultural output per head in the LDCs is corroborated
by a recent study by the U. S. Department of Agriculture, which shows,
for 1954-73, an annual rate of increase in per capita production of
foods of 0.4 percent per year for the developing countries (compared
with a rate of 1.5 percent for the developed countries).

6

Short-term changes in subperiods of the time span for which
the average growth rate is calculated do not necessarily cluster closely
around the average.

This is particularly true when total product

comprises major sectors in which vagaries of weather from year to year
may affect output (as in the case in so many LDCs), or when it is subject
to short-term strains of changing markets and demand (as is the case in
the smaller LDCs that rely heavily on export).

Thus, even for a very

large region, such as East and Southeast Asia, the indexes of GDP per
capita, which rise over 1960-72, show a drop of stability from 1964
through 1966, and from 1971 to 1972

three out of the twelve annual

changes, while in two others the change was a rise of only slightly
over 1 percent.

The record for Africa, excluding South Africa, shows

two declines in per capita GDP, one no-change, and two rises of barely
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1 percent (see YNAS 1973-II I, Table 6b).

For ind.ivid ual LDCs, sharp

declines in aggrega te product per capita and longer stagnati on periods
can easily be found within the twenty-t wo to twenty- five period spans.
Diversi ty in per capita growth rates among countrie s and
populati on groups within countrie s, in the growth performa nce of
differen t producti on sectors, and in the records for shorter subperio ds
within the total time span, could have been expected .

However , some

aspects of this diversit y among the LDCs in the past quarter of a century
are distinct ive.
First, there is a clear suggesti on that among the LDCs the com
bination of very low and even no growth at all in some cases with a high
average per capita growth rate is a common occurran ce.

This diversit y

in growth performa nce is far more striking than among the DCs.

Indeed,

of the eighteen DCs listed in the World Bank Atlas (we excluded
Puerto Rico), with a 1972 per capita GNP ranging from about $2,000 (for
Italy) to about $5,600 (for the United States), not one shows a per
capita growth rate for 1960-72 of less than 2 percent per year (the
lowest was New Zealand , with 2.1 percent ); and with the exceptio n of
Japan and Israel, both of which had rates well above 5 percent , the
range was from 2.1 to 4.7 (the average for all DCs, for 1960-72 , shown
by United Nations , was 3.8 percent per year, see YNAS, 1973, III,
Table 4b).

In general , the world of the LDC market economi es seems

much more diverse than that of the DCs--in the range of per capita
product from less than $100 to over $700, in the duration of their
existenc e as indepen dent, sovereig n states, in size, and in what might
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be called the distinctive long-term conditions that determined their
historical heritage.

The DCs, with their income range from about $2 to

less than $6 thousand, with their common origin within the framework
of European civilization (except for Japan), and with the common impress
upon them of the social and economic effects of modernization and
industrialization, exhibit far less diversity.
Indeed, one could argue that diversity among the LDCs widened
in the post World War II period, if one can reasonably compare the
situation with the earlier decades when most of the independent
sovereign states of today in Africa and Asia were colonial possessions
of Western powers.

The multiplication of new sovereignties, in large

numbers and at different dates, with varying degrees of preparedness
and with diverse historical heritage that conditioned unity within and
viability without of the new states of such different size and endowment,
would in itself add to diversity in growth performance over the last
two to three decades--setting aside the differences in purely economic
factors.

The difficulty that many of the new states faced in attaining

lasting consensus and unity, and still do, needs no proof.

It is evident

in the incidence of civil conflicts and wars and the widespread imposition
of a military dictatorship as a last recourse in stabilizing internal
conditions to permit peace and some growth to occur.

One could thus

argue that the impressive rise in the average growth rate of per capita
product among the LDCs, perhaps partly associated with the spread of
political independence, has been accompanied by an almost inescapable
widening of diversity in the growth rates among these countries.

Since
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the number of the units that have become independent sovereignties has
increased tremendously,but at different times, during the last twenty
five years, it is not surprising that diversity in growth performance
among periods has also grown.

Stagnation or decline during some

difficult political or other phase was followed by an accelerated
growth, at historically phenomenal rates, during the next subperiod.
Second, the particularly low growth rate in per capita
output of the agricultural sector, and the wide contrast between it
and the growth rates of the I and S sectors, raise questions that
are specially relevant to the LDCs.

To begin with, such differences

mean that the weighting of the sectors in arriving at the aggregate
growth rate is important.

If the price structure is such that the I

and S prices relative to A prices are higher than in the world markets,
the I-S weights are exaggerated and the aggregate growth rate is
biased upward.

A more critical factor is the susceptibility of the

A sector to short-term fluctuations, to diversity of its short-term
growth exper:i.ence among regions of a large LDCs, since it is the major
provider of the consumption needs of the populous low income strata
within any LDC.

Thus, a low growth rate of the per capita output of

the A sector is associated with recurring declines or stagnation of
the per capita supply of foods, in conditions in which such recurrent
crises pose major organizational and political problems--and one need
not go far to find examples in recent years.

The possible concurrent

growth of industrial output or the S sector at a high rate, total and
per capita, is not an effective offset.

It is only an indication of
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the continuity in building the non-agricultural framework to higher
levels, and would be fully warranted only if long-term recovery of
the A sector or long-term prospects of adequate substitution for the
domestic supply of the A-goods can be expected.

Here again, the

natural diversity in the conditions of the A sector

augments the

diversity of aggregate growth experience among the LDCs.
Third, as already suggested, initial per capita product of
most populous LDCs was, and is, quite moderate.

With the usual

internal inequality in the distribution of income within the countries,
per capita levels were low indeed for large population groups.

Hence,

inadequate growth or regression, discontinuities over time, are
particularly costly in terms of human welfare--as they need not be
in countries with relatively high per capita product and economic and
social reserves for coping with short-term recessions or growth
retardation.

If diversity has been fairly wide among the LDCs, in

growth rates over the full span, in variability of rates from subperiod
to subperiod, particularly in the A sector, the combination of a high
average growth rate for the all-embracing group of all LDCs with a
flurry of crises and deprivation problems affecting now some, then
other, members of the group, can be taken as "normal".

The broader

implications of such partial and temporary crises, particularly for
policy choices and understanding of the immediate past and the proximate
future, must be inferred from weighing

of crises and deprivations

against possible gains in the longer run.

Such a calculus, admittedly

difficult, is required if longer-term policy and prospects are not to
be distorted by mis-interpretation of partial and temporary difficulties.
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(b)

Given

diversity in growth rates of per capita product

among the LDCs and their populations, or among sectors within a
country, or variability of both sets of growth rates over

subperiods,

the proper choice of weights used for aggregation and averaging is
important.

The weights implicit in these summarization processes

must, therefore, be examined for their effect on the averages of the
type used above to initiate the discussion. 7
If the levels of per capita product of the several population
groups (within countries, or among countries or regions) differ at the
start of the growth period, and if the growth rates of the per capitas
also differ, the average growth rate for the aggregate will be much
affected by the weights used.

In the conventional calculations, of

the type used by the United Nations, the sum of all products is related
to the sum of all populations at the beginning and end of the growth
period; and the average growth rate is calculated from the changes
between the initial and terminal ratios (or along a straight line
fitted to the annual ratios).

In this procedure the average growth

rate is affected by: (a) differences in the increase of populations
with different levels of per capita product, so that if the population
of richer LDCs grows relatively more than that of the poorer, the
average growth rate in per capita product will be raised; (b) weights
for the separate population groups, which are the size of population
multiplied by per capita product, or total product.
of the procedure is defensible.

Neither implication

Pooling among the LDCs, which would

make the greater population growth of the richer countries meaningful to
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the poorer, is non-existent.

And there is no reason to assign greater

weight to the per capita growth rate of a richer country than to that of
a poorer.

A more defensible procedure would be to hold constant the

shares in total population of groups or countries with different initial
product levels; and, particularly, to weight each country's or group's
growth rate in per capita product by population, not by product.

Indeed,

for more plausible welfare connotations, one might argue that the growth
rates in per capita product for the poorer countries should be weighted
by their population raised by a multiple over 1.0, and for the richer
countries, by their population lowered by a multiple less than 1.0.
The distinction between the conventional and the population
weighted averages of growth rates is of particular relevance to the
experience of the LDCs in the last two to two and a half decades.

During

this period the richer of the LDCs (largely in Latin America)had the
higher rate of population growth; and even more important, the richer
LDCs showed higher growth rates in per capita product than the poorer
LDCs, the latter largely in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Consequently,

the conventional procedure yields an average growth rate in per capita
product for the LDCs as a group that is biased upward.

With the structure

of recent growth experience as noted above, the adjustment based on
the use of constant population weights is sizeable.

Thus, for the 67

LDCs covered in the World Bank Atlas for which we used growth rates of
per capita GNP for 1960-72 (see discussion above), and

for which

per capita GNP ranged in 1960 (in 1972 prices) from about $60 to about
$500, the conventional calculation yields an average growth rate of
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2.62 percent per year.

The use of the 1960 population weights yields

an average growth rate in per capita product of 2.01--a reduction of
close to a quarter.

Similarly significant differences are shown in the

paper cited in footnote 7.
If growth rates in per capita output of the various sectors
differ, with that in the contribution of the A sector particularly low,
the weights of the rapidly and slowly growing sectors obviously
affects the combined product growth rate even for a single country;
and we have already alluded to the possible adjustment for over
valuation of the industry and service sectors relative to that of
the agriculture sector.

But even more far-reaching questions arise

concerning the character of some of the rapidly growing sectors -
questions that have been discussed for decades in the national income
literature.

If the share of government (among other services) has

grown as it has in so many LDCs in recent decades, indicating a higher
than average growth rate for that particular subsector, and if much
of it was for development of administrative, defense, and similar
maintenance functions, one could view these outputs as intermediate-
as costs of operation, not as final product.

With the resulting

narrower and purer definition of national product, the growth rate of
the aggregate-in which a rapidly growing subsector was now assigned
a weight of zero--would presumably be reduced.

And this is in fact

the result if we limit national product to the outputs of the A and I
sectors, and either omit the S sector completely or reduce its weight
substantially as compared with its weight in conventional national
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economic accounting (some illustration s are provided in the paper in
footn0te 7, in particular Section 4).
There is a related argument in connection with the variability
of growth rates in total per capita product or important components,
over short subperiods.

The argument is that an average growth rate over

two decades of say 2 percent per year means one thing when the annual
changes within the period range from 1.7 to 2.3 percent per year, and
another when declines in several of the annual intervals are offset by
higher than average rates in other intervals.

The difference, of course,

lies in the special difficultie s created by variability

over time,

particularl y in the output of final goods required for "basic" needs,
and by changes that are non-system atic and hence not easily foreseen.
One could argue that in averaging annual changes over the span of two
decades, the annual declines should be given greater weight and the high
offsetting rates given lower weight than their mere arithmetic value-
all of this compared with standard weights that would be attached to
annual changes that are identical with, or close to, the simple average
value over the full period.

Use of such a weighting system would

clearly reduce the averages for those LDCs for which the record shows a
combination of annual declines or small rises in some intervals with
explosively high rates in others--and these would be LDCs in which
agriculture , sensitive to vagaries of weather,is of great weight,or
the large number of those which, during the period since World War II,
had major difficultie s in establishin g a peaceful and viable national
state.
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Even this brief note on the effects of diversity and variability
on aggregation and averaging-for the LDCs suggests a Pandora's box of
difficult and question-provok ing adjustments.

It is impossible here,

and would be difficult elsewhere, to approximate and test the magnitudes
of the warranted modifications.

The illustrative calculations in the

paper mentioned above, which did not touch on effects of the variability
of growth rates over time, reduced substantially the aggregate average
growth rate for per capita product of the LDCs (limited to East and
Southeast Asia and Latin America).

For the period 1954-58 to 1964-68,

the conventional rate of some 2.0 percent per year dropped to between
1.1 and 1.4 percent (see Table 9 of the paper cited in footnote 7).
And the effect is all the greater, because for the DCs the application
of some of these adjustments

raised rather than lowered the average

growth rate in per capita product.
With no way of advancing the subject further, one may conclude
with three general observations.

First, the diversity and variability

in the growth patterns of the LDCs, or within the individual countries,
are an important datum in judging the significance of the averages for
the LDCs as a whole, both for translating the current changes into long
term trends and for any gE!neral hypotheses about fact©rs affecting the
economic growth of the LDCs.

Second, the conventional aggregates and

averages tend to exaggerate, to bias upward the composite measures for
the LDCs--which they do not do for the DCs--the main reason being that,
at least over the last two decades, the poorer LDCs showed lower growth
rates in per capita product and more vulnerability to variability over
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time than the richer LDCs, an association not found among the DCs.
7hird, the completely adjusted purified growth rates in per capita
product among the LDCs may prove to be higher than that which
prevailed among them in the past--and perhaps not inferior to similarly
adjusted pre-World War II long-term rates among the current DCs.

But

this last suggestion is only a plausible guess, and would require
testing after the implicit conceptual questions have been resolved.
3.

Population Growth and Institutional Innovations
The growth of per capita product among the LDCs was attained

in decades marked by a high rate of population increase.

According to

the annual indexes of total and per capita GDP, available from the
United Nations for 1950-72, for the LDCs as a group (conventional
procedure) the growth rate for the 22 years was 2.53 per year; that of
population--2.4 3 per year; and that of total product--5.03 per year. 8
For the DCs the same series show a growth rate of per capita product
of 3.29 percent per year, of population only 1.09 percent per year,
of total gross domestic product 4.42 percent per year--or almost a
third higher, or less than a half, or about a tenth lower, respectively
than those for the LDCs.
It thus appears that failure of the growth rate, conventional
or adjusted, in per capita product of the LDCs to keep up with, let
alone move toward, that of the DCs lies in the much higher rate of
population growth in the former.

And one can easily calculate that with

the same growth rate of total product, but much more moderate rate of
population increase of say 1 percent per year, the rate of increase in
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per capita produc t for the LDCs would climb to almost 4 percen t per
year.

Or, as has often been said, popula tion growth has been eating

up the fruits of the growth of produc t, leaving a small residua l for
the rise in per capita income.
Whatev er our judgme nt of the threate ning implic ations of
popula tion increas e in the LDCs for the longer- term future, the
sugges tion that the high rate of popula tion growth is an explan atory
determ inant of the modera te growth in per capita income
and mislead ing.
is an inadeq uate

is both easy

In and of itself, the rate of popula tion increas e
explan ation of either the succes s or failure of

growth measure d on a per capita level.

In this connec tion the

popula tion growth variab le is signifi cant largely in that it reflect
s
the institu tional and social conditi ons of a country .
To begin with, the higher rate of popula tion growth of the
LDCs than of the DCs

is a recent phenom enon: for decade s before the

1930s, and back -to the early ninetee nth century , the rate of the former
was marked ly below that of the latter. 9

To be sure, this was due to a

much higher death rate in the less develop ed region s, which kept the
rate of natura l increas e down despite fairly high crude birth rates-
an extrem ely ineffic ient method of popula tion contro l, and one that
could not contrib ute to social and-eco nomic produc tivity.

But it is

import ant to recogn ize that only in the 1930s, and especi ally after
World War II, the LDCs began to show signifi cantly higher popula tion
growth rates than the DCs; and that while some birth rates did rise,
the trend was due largely to a rapid reducti on of death and morbid
ity
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rates--one of the first requirements of, and a most important and
valuable ingredient in, modern economic growth.
Second, if population, viewed as a collective of consumers,
grew more rapidly in the LDCs, and thus can be debited with a greater
proportionate draft upon the fruits of economic growth, it also grew
more rapidly as a collective of potential workers and should be
credited with a greater contribution to total product.

The source in

footnote 9 shows that for a less developed group of regions (Africa,
Latin America, and South Asia), whose total population grew from 1.08
billion in 1950 to about 1.75 billion in 1970, or at an annual rate of
2.43 percent, population aged 15-64 and thus classifiable as the
potential labor force
2.24 percent per year.

grew from 602 to 940 million, or at a rate of
In the developed regions, including North

America, Australia-New Zealand, Japan and Europe, excluding Eastern
Europe, total population grew from 563 to 701 million, or at an annual
rate of 1.1 percent and so did the population aged 15-64, rising from
361 to 449 million (see Tables 2 and 8, pp 7 and 18 of the source).
Thus the rate' of growth of population of working age in the LDCs was
more than twice that in the DCs; and one may ask why these additional
workers could not have contributed at least to about the same proportional
rise in product per capita in the two groups of countries.
Third, while in comparing LDCs and DCs as groups, we find
that a higher rate of population•increase in the former is associated
with a lower growth rate of per capita product, at least for the past
two to two and a half decades,

this association does not hold for
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the individual countries within the LDC group.

Using the 67 LDCs, with

their records for 1960-72 found in the World Bank Atlas, we classified
them by their rates of population increase over these twelve years, which
averaged 2.5 percent per year (weighted by 1960 population) .

For twenty

nine, not counting India, the growth rate of population was 2.5 percent
or less.

Their population was 356 million in 1960, and their population

weighted average growth rate in per capita income was 2.1 percent per
year.

India, with a 1960 population of 432 million, had a growth rate

of population of 2.3 percent per year and of per capita product of 1.1
percent.

In the remaining 37 countries, with a 1960 population of 413

million, the growth rate of population was more than 2.5 percent per
year, and the population-w eighted growth rate of per capita product was
2.9 percent per year.

Thus, the association among the LDCs between

the rate of population increase and the growth rate in per capita
product was, if anything, positive rather than negative--r eflecting
in large part the difference in growth rates between Latin America and
the other LDC regions.

It would not be difficult to suggest specific

explanation s, but the finding is cited merely to indicate that over
recent decades other factors tended to outweigh the high rates of
population growth, at least among the LDCs.
Fourth, the acceleratio n in the rate of population increase
in the LDCs has been marked

because the rate of decline in the death

rates was extremely high--about five times as fast in the two to three
decades as the decline of mortality rates among the DCs in their
population -transition phase.

And since the decline in birth rates
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has lagged behind that of death rates in the past experience of the
currently developed countries, it is assumed that the lag in the case
of the LDCs is only to be expected.

But historical analogies may be

misleading; and unless there is a tested explanation and an indication
of the operative mechanism, references to lags are just description s
of still to be explained events.

This connnent is particularl y relevant

because in many LDCs in Latin America long-term declines in death rates
have been accompanyin g long-term rises in per capita product, and yet
there has been no indication of a responsive fall in crude (or age-of
women standardize d) birth rates. 10

One would expect that thirty to

forty years of substantial decline in mortality, including that in
infant and children's mortality, would lead-to some contraction of
birth rates, assuming that the high level of the latter in the past may
have served in part to offset the deaths of infants and young children.
The persistence of high birth rates, therefore, calls for an explanation .
Some tentative hypotheses to try to account for the persistence
(and components) of high levels of fertility in the LDCs in recent decades
have been presented elsewhere. 11

But they should be summarized here, if

only because they interpret the patterns of demographic behavior as
reflection of economic and institution al conditions that have a major
bearing on economic growth in the LDCs.
The relevant hypotheses were noted under three broad heads:
technology of birth control; possibly lower costs of bearing and rearing
children in the LDCs; possibly higher returns from larger numbers of
children in the LDCs.

The technology of birth control was viewed as
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affecting some segment of the population of the LDCs, the group that
wishes to have fewer ch~ldren.

However, even for this group, a variety

of birth control methods, which, in the long-term past, had led to
control of population numbers (e.g., postponing the age of marriages of
females) were still available.

Since the groups did not have to depend

on the modern means, the significance of the technology factor is
reduced.

Nor is it clear that the desire for fewer children affects a

substantial proportion of the population of the LDCs in their child
bearing ages.

The lower absolute costs of children in the LDCs are

clearly recognized; but one may question whether these costs, relative
to the economic level of the parental population, are so low, compared
with their costs in the nuclear families of the developed countries.
Furthermore, costs cannot be effectively discussed without consideration
of returns, and it seemed warranted to place the burden of explanation
on the returns from children.

The implication then is that in the LDCs,

families, in their own responses, and possibly reflecting the norms of
blood-related collectives and societies wider than the family, view
children as an investment, as a source of wealth, defined broadly as
economic and social power--in the conditions, determined by economic
and social institutions, within which they live.
Two aspects of this investment in children are spelled out
in quotations from the paper cited in footnote 11.

"One is the

economic, labor pool aspect, the desire for more children because under
the rural or small family business conditions of the LDCs, children
are a supply of labor at the disposal of the family that, after some years,
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provides economic savings and

advance far greater than any that could

be generated by the same family unit with fewer offspring ."

The second

aspect of investmen t in children may be designate d the genetic pool
aspect, relevant to those societies among the LDCs in which economic and
social mobility is blocked by monopoli zation of economic and social power
by a few families.

Hence limiting the number of children and giving them

greater training or education is no assurance of future economic or
social rise.

"Under such condition s, advance for the offspring of the

lowly is a matter of success based on personal character istics or
endowmen ts, on a kind of genetic lottery that may turn up a dictatori al
corporal or general, or a successfu l athlete, or the female consorts of
either, so prevalent in many LDCs."

Here a rational calculatio n would

call for as many children as will survive to maturity, as many more
tickets in the genetic lottery.
The third, and perhaps most far reaching, aspect of the
investmen t in children is that of security- -not merely or primarily the
economic security of parents who, in their old age, have to rely on
the help of surviving children, but much broader, encompass ing protectio n
against natural and social calamitie s, protectio n not provided by the
governmen t or other,

not blood-rel ated organs of society.

The pressure

in many pre-indu strial societies (e.g. for centuries in China) for
larger families and a wider blood-tie group has been associate d with the
weakness of the governmen t, and the need to rely on family ties for
security of the individua l members.
non-bloo d-related organizat ions

So long as governme ntal and other

remain weak in this respect, an adequate
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increase of those related by protective blood-ties will be a high
priority goal, despite possible short-term disadvantages.
Two aspects of these tentative hypotheses advanced to explain
the ·high fertility levels in the LDCs, and thus their high rates of
population growth, should be noted.

One is that emphasis on returns

from children as the main factor is corroborated by the structural
characteristics of the high fertility rates in the LDCs, to which the
main burden of the paper just cited is devoted: the entry of females
into marriage at early ages;

the continuation of childbearing to much

more advanced ages of married women than in the DCs; the importance of
high parity births; and the high proportion of children born to aged
mothers and particularly to aged fathers (beyond 40 years of age)-
despite the presence of a number of surviving siblings.

All this seems

to suggest, although it does not prove, that the production of large
numbers of children is a systematic and planned activity, rather than
a reflection of impetuous and uncurbed passion or of blir1d adherence
to some traditional and increasingly irrational pattern.
The second, and more important, aspect of the hypotheses, is
the emphasis on fertility rates as rational responses of the population
to the economic and social conditions, implying that major declines in
fertility are not likely until these conditions are changed. 12

The

emphasis is then on economic and social structure, and the key factor
suggested as setting limits to the economic growth of the LDCs is then
the capacity of the societies for the kind of institutional innovation,
for changing the existing economic and social institutions so as to take
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advantage of the potentials ·of modern, i.e., more advanced technology.
In their specific form, these potentials would differ from country to
country depending on the historically conditioned endowments and the
changing stock of available technology.

This implication is of particular relevance in the present
connection.

It may be amplified by suggesting that just as population

growth cannot be treated as an exogenous variable determining growth
rates in per capita product but must be viewed as the result of human
decisions in roughly rational response to economic and social conditions,
neither can we assume that there are some rigid technological constraints
on the growth of the LDCs that would explain their limited achievements
in the way of increased per capita product in the recent past.

In

particular, one must resist the tempting argument that because these
LDCs are poor, they cannot generate sufficient savings to finance the
capital formation necessary for higher growth rates.

The proportional

magnitude of material capital required for growth rates higher than those
achieved would not be large even in economies with relatively low product
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per capital-if a backlog exists in technological opportunities, and
effective utilization of productive factors is assumed.

With flexibility

of factor proportions, facilitated by choices in the rate of utilization
of both capital and labor, relatively low capital-output ratios can be
attained.

Of course, an abundance of capital can be used in a trade-

off for greater inefficiency; but this possibility does not justify the
view that capital shortages are a key factor in limiting growth rates
in the LDCs.

That view is widely prevalent, despite the experience of

not a few LDCs that managed to reach high levels of growth in per capita
product with high rates of population growth and with adequate domestic
savings proportions, low average incomes notwithstanding ; and despite
similar experiences in the past of a number of current DCs.
One must look then for the key factor in the capacity of LDCs
to adjust their economic and institutional structure in order to provide
optimal, or at least adequate, channels for growth.

Such adjustments

may easily be constrained for non-economic reasons, for example by
resistance to the abandonment of wasteful practices that have assumed
quasi-religious significance, and represent no special interest of any
group.

Or it may be that institutional changes affect adversely some

groups while benefiting others, and the consensus for such changes is
absent.

Or it is possible that a higher rate of economic growth, with

its disruptive (as well as productivity-ra ising) effects would, if
forced, upset the basic consensus and threaten the unity of the country,
causing unavoidable delays in economic advance.
For this reference to innovations in economic and social
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institutions, and to the difficulties of sustaining them, to be more
than a shift of focus to a rather vague concept of "capacity for
modernization," calls for careful examination of individual LDCs.

By

this approach, those countries that have delayed the adjustment, that
have adopted limited growth-promoting policies, that have not removed
the obstacles to an effective program, and those that have suffered
breakdowns,can be compared with others of apparent success, and their
specific antecedents to that success.

Such an attempt would have to

rely on the rapidly growing literature on the LDCs, whose diversity
was emphasized earlier; and is certainly beyond the scope of a brief
summary.

One may still argue that, barring conditions of political

subjection, a sovereign less developed economy, seen as a unit in a
diversified world and with many technological opportunities, cannot
properly be viewed as having the limits on its growth set within
reasonable magnitudes, by factors exogenous to its economic and social
conditions--i.e. either in its genes, or in its demography, or in some
aspect of technology (with possible exception of Eskimos in the Arctic
wilderness, or nomads in the desert).

And one can cite evidence from

both recent and past history on the difficulties that the currently
developed countries in the 19th century past had in organizing themselves
for modern economic growth--establishing a unified state that could
channel such growth effectively.

If one thinks of the rapid succession

of internal conflicts in the two recent decades--in Pakistan, in
Nigeria, in the Congo, in Ethiopia; the rapid changes in political regimes,
frequently ending in military dictatorships or one-party government, in
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many LDCs, includin g those in Latin America, which have been politica lly
sovereig n for many years--o ne can see that setting and maintain ing the
bas'ic conditio ns for economic growth is a demandin g and never-en ding task:
The solution s of this task
sacrific e- of

can vary greatly in terms of adherenc e to or

princip les highly prized by many societie s (individ ual

liberty , equality , or coopera tion in loss and gain).

It is the difficul ty

of easing this task that must be identifi ed, in the first instance , as
the proxima te cause of the shortfa lls in growth among the LDCs, shortfa ll
that may be viewed as avoidab le.
The

difficu lty is exacerb ated by two conseque nces of the low

per capita product of the populous LDCs.

One, already noted, is

vulnera bility to short-te rm calamit ies--due to dependen ce upon less
advanced agricult ure, and greater difficu lties in coping with natural
disaster s (earthqu akes, floods, etc)--be cause of lack of reserves that
could be utilized to deal with crop failures and other disaste rs, and
weaknes s of transpo rt and other means of mobiliz ation.

The other

consequ ence that deserves mention is the technolo gical distance_ between
the low-inco me and even middle-i ncome LDCs and the develope d countrie s
from which they could borrow technolo gy and secure assistan ce.

The

technol ogical distance means that while, in general, there is a
substan tial backlog of accumul ated technolo gy that has not been exploite d
in the past by LDCs, the current supply of technolo gy and technolo gical
opportu nities availab le in the DCs may be of little value to the LDCs.
They, to illustra te, may need better small-sc ale transpo rt or economi cal
water pumps rather than complex compute rs, nuclear installa tions, or
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supersoni c airplanes .

The flexibili ty of choice of capital and labor

apparentl y open to the LDCs may thus be limited by the non-avai lability
of a better technolog y that would suit their particula r needs, and the
scarcity of technical talent to generate the adaptive uses of whatever
can be effective ly borrowed from the DCs.
These two consequen ces provide a partial explanati on of the
finding that the poorer LDCs in Asia and Sub-Sahar an Africa, with their
low per capita incomes, showed a lower growth rate of both total and
per capita product than the richer LDCs, particula rly in Latin America
(excludin g the oil rich units from all groups).
explanati on, because

It is ouly a partial

so many LDCs in the Asian and African regions

have only recently attained their political independe nce.

Many of

these faced particula r difficult ies in establish ing a unified, and
viable, new political entity, with an incidence of civil conflicts and
political breakdown s; and in some of them the resulting constrain ts
upon economic performan ce and growth have continued .

But even allowing

for these major struggles in initial national formation , it may stilJ.
be true that the greater vulnerab ility of the lower income LDCs and
their greater technolog ical distance from the DCs contribut ed to a
lower growth rate in recent decades than that of these LDCs, whose
higher initial per capita product and a greater extent of industria l
ization

reduced their vulnerab ility to short-term calamitie s and made

adoption of modern technolog y easier.
4.

Evaluatio n of,and Response to, Economic Growth
Assume that, with the adjustmen ts suggested in Section 2,

the.growt h rate in per capita product of the LDCs over the last quarter
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century averages between 1 and 1.5 percent per year, which means a
total rise over the period of between 28 and 45 percent.

Consider also

that an increase in real return per head is indicated by such evidence
as the marked reduction in death rates over the period by between a
quarter and a half; rising per capita consumption; and
of education and health.

higher levels

Has an evaluation of, and response to, this,

undeniable, economic advance of the LDCs, and for most of them after
a long period of stagnation, been affected by changed expectationsi
And if so, why and how did expectations change?
In observing evaluation of economic growth in the DCs, three
characteristics can be suggested, at least as related to modern economic
growth.

First, growth appears larger in prospect than in retrospect:

quantity indexes weighted by beginning-of-period prices yield appreciably
higher rates than the same indexes weighted by end-of-period prices.
This difference is due to the fact that new, innovation-related products
are priced much more highly in the earlier years --before their wide
spread and rapid growth, and the associated improvement in efficiency
and reduction in costs--than in later years when these products become
cheaper quasi-necessities.

Second, all innovation-powered economic

growth eventually generates problems of adjustment and undesirable
externalities--many unforeseeable in the early stages, because of
inadequate knowledge of the properties of the technological innovation
and of the social innovation that it may bring into being.

This is

an almost inevitable result of some "new11 elements in an innovation,
which by definition is a venture into the partly unknown.

Third,
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since current events are always much more heavily weighted than past,
the evaluation of economic growth tends to be biased downward, in the
deflation of the initially high values of the positive contribution of
innovations and in the concentration on the current problems generated
by them.

The beneficiaries of electric power or of the internal

combustion engine, for example, tend to take them for granted, while
justifiably complaining of either pollution or failure of centralized
sources of energy affecting millions of people.

They forget the older

days of confinement in equally or more polluted cities without a chance
to escape to the suburbs,or of dependence on sources of light and energy
far less efficient than centrally provided electric power.

Similarly,

in the field of health, the beneficiaries of reduced mortality in the
younger ages are concerned over the degenerative diseases of older
people, and over the prolongation of life
pleasant

t,)

ages when it can be neither

nor productive.
If tempered by consideration of the longer-term contribution

of past economic growth, such emphasis on current problems, such an
implicit downward bias,may be justified.

It is a necessary stimulus for

overcoming the problems, or at least mitigating their effects.

But the

important point is the relevance of these observations to the view held
by the LDCs of their economic attainments and growth in relation to their
distance from the DCs.

For with respect to the latter the LDCs are, in

a way, like earlier versions of the DCs, the earlier generations of the
latter who appraise growth in prospect rather than in retrospect, and
the price weights of the LDCs are an analogue of the beginning-of-period
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prices used in weighting the quantity indexes.

This analogy is confirmed

by the recent study of comparative purchasing power on an internation al
scale cited in footnote 2.

To illustrate, when we compare consumption

per capita in India and the United States, using Indian price weights,
the ratio of quantities (India to US) is 1 to 22.2; whereas when we use
the US price weights, the ratio is 1 to 12.0 (see source~
p. 174).

Table 13.5,

Similar results can be found for the US-Colombia and US-Kenya

binary comparisons .

In other words, the LDCs, using their own standard

to evaluate the levels of the DCs appraise them more highly and find
the distance to them greater than would the DCs, using their standard
and appraising the distance to the LDCs.

Likewise, one could suggest

that not having fully experienced modern economic growth, the LDCs are
much less aware of (or concerned about) some of the maladjustme nts and
negative externaliti es that

it brings in its wake.

Thus,

the LDCs would evaluate growth much more highly than the DCs.

Further

more, if in their evaluation of their own growth at least a part of the
yardstick is formed by the attainments of the DCs, the distance to be at
least partially reduced and the gap to be closed

loom wide indeed.

We come now to the question as to the bases of evaluation
of economic growth in the LDCs, evaluation within those countries as
to the adequacy or shortfall of the growth attained.

As already indicated,

we deal here with intangibles , not susceptible of quantificat ion or hard
evidence (at least not at hand).

Yet the judgment involved is an important

factor in the response to economic growth that has already occurred,
possibly inducing change-prov oking action if growth is found to be
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significantly short of the minimum goals.

In concluding this paper, it

would be tempting to speculate on the yardstick, the expectations, that
may be applied, and on the changes in such expectations that may have
But even such speculation involves review

occurred in recent decades.

of various goals--some competing, some complementary (greater output,
more equity, minimum assurance of defense power in the divided and
hostile world, adequate individual freedom, and so on)., and this is
beyond my scope and competence.
Instead, one may point out some aspects of the evaluation and
possible response that are apparent from the discussion.

First, if in

evaluating economic growth, the emphasis is not so much on the rise that
may have been attained but on the distance to some minimum goal, the
judgment will depend on the distance between the goal and the initial
economic position of the country; as well as on the tolerance of
interruptions and delays.

To illustrate: if a country begins with a per

capita product of $100, and has also previously suffered from shortterm failures, the goal of growth may be set at $500 as a desirable level
that would also act as protection from short-term disasters or, at
least, minimize their impact.

If then it is assumed that a fair target

is to reach this level in fifty years (or thereabouts), an average growth
rate in per capita product of about 3. 3 percent per year is expected.
If, over a twenty-five year period, growth has, in fact, raised per capita
product by 50 percent, the movement was only an eighth of that necessary
to cover the total distance--even with the target remaining fixed (and it
is likely to move upward over time).

For such a calculation the comparison
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of the actual growth rates in the LDCs, either with those in their own
past or those in the past records of the DCs, is not relevant.

In the

past of these LDCs, particularly those that were not free to plan their
own destinies, such economic goals were overshadowed by the goal of
political freedom and independence.

And in the past history of the

current DCs, even of the follower countries, initial levels were much
higher (except perhaps for Japan) and the distance between these levels
and the goals set was narrower--so that the growth rates viewed as
feasible and acceptable might have been distinctly below those that the
recent post-World War II growth experience warranted.
Second, the same applies to distributive aspects of growth,
to effects on inequality in the distribution of returns--which we did
not touch upon partly for lack of space, but largely for lack of
reliable data--despite prolific discussion in the recent literature.
If the goal is to avoid, with given aggregate growth, deterioration of
economic position of large, lower income groups, the requirement of some
significant advance applies not only to the country as a whole, but to
sub-groups of the population.

The failure of crops affecting farme!s,

or unemployment and underemployment affecting

large proportions of

the labor force augmented by rapid population growth, represent shortfalls-
even if the over-all advance of the country may have been impressive by
past standards.
Third, it may be realistically argued that the,expectations,
the yardsticks by which economic growth is evaluated, have changed in
recent years.

Goals are more ambitious and delays are less well
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tolerated than probably was the case in the pre-World War II past.

The

increased technological power of man, and the rapidity with which
devastated countries recovered and forged ahead after World War II, the
success in reducing and wiping out disease and ill-health the world over,
and the high rates of economic growth achieved by so many countrie~ had
an effect similar to that ushered in by modern economic growth when it
emerged in the pioneer and early follower countries in the late
eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century.

The effect was

to strengthen the view of man as the creator of his destiny, of the vast
potential power of man's advancing knowledge in providing economic
abundance, once the needed adjustments of social structure were made;
and in the widening ties of communication in the world, to spread the
view to countries that had previously failed to exploit adequately the
potentials of modern technology.

These two strains--of the dominant

power and potential of modern technology (and of the stock of useful
knowledge behind it) and its accessibility to any human society willing
(and presumably capable) to make the needed adjustments in social
and economic structure to channel this power properly--have certainly
been strengthened

and spread more widely in the world

in the post

World-War II decades both, by a denser network of communication

and by

examples of extraordinarily high economic performance bordering on
miracles.
Fqurth, the spread of political independence to so many
national units in the world, which proceeded at such a phenomenally
rapid rate after World War II, and is still continuing, created that
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many more foci of responsib ility for economic growth.

It proceeded on

the tacit assumptio n, sometimes overt in the propagand a literatur e for
political freedom, that the new sovereign powers would be capable of
adequate response to the challenge of economic growth--o r would, at
least, be more responsiv e than when they were colonies.

In that sense,

adequate economic growth was viewed as a promise, as a first priority
task, by those many and populous LDCs that attained sovereign ty only
after World War II; as it has become for all states,
with the recogniti on that it is the social
response- -not natural resource, not genetic endowmen ts, not even the
existing stock of material capital-- that is crucial.

In the case of

the poorer LDCs, the challenge was, of course, much more acute, because
they lacked reserves for ameliorat ing the effects of short-term relapses
and of temporary stagnatio n.
Fifth, the multiplic ation of sovereign units represent ed, and
naturally contribut ed to, the strengthe ning of nationali st tendencie s
and positions in the world--if only as a matter of establish ing more
firmly the new identitie s and developin g a consensus on the basis of
a feeling of common belonging .

But this was also a divisive tendency;

and in the newly establish ed national units there has often been room
for strife within (among divergent , ethnic, tribal or religious groups),
and for conflict without.

Economic growth was, consequen tly, sought

to provide not only adequate economic returns to the populatio n but
also the sinews of strength in establish ing viable unity within the
country and in assuring an adequate defensive posture vis-a-vis the
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outside.

The intensification of industrialization in many LDCs,

particularly the larger ones, sometimes to the neglect of agriculture,
was clearly motivated by the need for some minimum domestic supply of
tools that, however'useful in peace, were indispensable in case of
armed conflict.

And this made judgment of adequacy of economic growth

dependent not merely on progress towards peaceful goals, but on its
provision of the minimum power for self-protection in a divided and
hostile world.
These brief comments, which could be elaborated by numerous
illustrations taken from the record of.events in the last few years,
are sufficient to indicate that the :~valuatipn of economic growth
attainments in the LDCs, by the people involved (in so far as one can
judge from the outside), may be in terms of high expectations, of
yardsticks that involve fairly ambitious goals.

It is the application

of such yardsticks that may explain the tension and strain, the search
for modifications of national and international structures.

This would

be only a natural response to the Judgment of inadequacy of the growth
attained so far, and given the dominant theory that potentials of modern
technology and modern economic growth are accessible and available once
the necessary modifications of economic and social structure, at home
and abroad, are made.
Such a response is not without danger.

If economic growth

problems of the LDCs can effectively be met only by changes in internal
social and economic structure, and possibly even require changes in
the international framework that channels relations between the LDCs
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and the rest of the world, it is also true that each change or
modification has its specific cost--short-term for the groups that are
affected adversely, and long-term for the whole society.

And no calculus

is available for measuring the balance of costs and gains, short-and
long-term, in order to provide guidance in seeking to maximize returns
for the society or societies involved.
The difficulty is that economic analysis of economic growth,
in terms of inputs and outputs, both the conventional and the more
expanded (including inputs into human capital, valuation of leisure, etc.),
is still too limited to encompass the costs and returns from modifying
the economic institutions, let alone the social.

How do we value the

cost of shifting from the status of independent worker to that of employee
--even if we can estimate the difference in average income?

How do we

measure the costs of displacement of rural population from the land and
of the migration to the cities for a long period of acclimatization and
adjustment to urban life?

Or in the case of more violent modifications

of social structures, how do we compare the costs of forceful re-education
campaigns (including concentration camps) with the additions of a fraction
of a growth rate in GNP, or in the product of heavy industry?

The questions

are not irrelevant, for these various alternatives have in f~ct been
followed, with differing results in terms of conventional economic product,
yet they obviously represent situations in which even the expanded
economic calculation yields only a narrowly partial answer.

And

emphasizing such analyses, as something we can do, in the hope that they
will shed some light on some aspects of the problems, may mean a dangerous
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neglect of unmeasured major factors.

We would, thereby, provide badly

biased answers, for situations in which the total costs are markedly
different from those measured.
Since the widespread and far-reaching change in economic and
social structures is a condition, part and parcel of modern economic
growth, economic analysis of growth in its present state is severely
limited.

However, this is no argument either for neglecting the need,

in a variety of situations, for such economic and social changes; or
for not pushing the study of economic growth toward a broader approach
in which the application of quantitative analysis and direct consideration
of the changes, past and present, in the institutional framework could
be combined.

Even if the combined measurement of economic costs and

costs of social change may prove impossible, the very identification
of changing aspects of social and economic institutions should be helpful,
both in refining the narrower economic analysis and in widening its use
for aspects of economic growth neglected until now.
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Footnotes

1

The figure, for "centrally planned economies" is from the

World Bank Atlas: Population; Per Capita Product, and Growth Rates,
(Washington, 1974), p. 8
2
These estimates of per capita GNP in US dollars are based on
modified or unadjusted exchange rates, and tend to exaggerate the
contrast--compared with the results of detailed adjustments of local
currency estimates for purchasing power parity.

Yet one should not

assume that such far reaching adjustments reduce the gap to a narrow
range.

A recent elaborate study yields some illuminating results (see

Irving B. Kravis, Zoltan Kennessey, Alan Heston, and Robert Summers,
A System of International Comparisons of Gross Products and Purchasing
Power, published for the World Bank by The Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, 1975).

In a comparison of India and the United St.ates,

to take an extreme example, the conversion by exchange rates yields a
ratio of per capita GDP of 2.04 to 100 (for 1970); that using per capita
quantity indexes based on international prices, yields a ratio of 7.12
to 100 (see Table 1.3, p. 8).

This is the largest proportional adjustment

of the ratios (3.5 = 7.12/2.04). Similar results for Kenya and Colo•bia
are 1.9 and 2.3 respectively.

If we assume a proportional adjustment of

about 2.5 for all low income LDCs relatively to all DCs, the ratio
indicated in the World Bank Atlas ($110 to $3,670, or 0.029) would rise
to 0.072 and the range between the per capita product of the two groups
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of countries would still be 1 to 14.

A range of this extent surely

warrants consideration of the implications of the low per capita
product of the LDCs for the vulnerability of their economies to short
term crises, and for the meaning of even relatively high rates of
growth in their per capita product.
3

The estimates for 1950-1960 are from United Nations,

Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1969, Vol. II, International
Tabies, (New York, 1970), Table 4b; those for 1960-72 are from
United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, Vol. III,
International Tables, (New York, 1975), Table 4b.

These volumes are

referred to briefly as YNAS, 1969, II; and YNAS 1973, III.
4

see Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth of Nations, Harvard

University Press, (Cambridge, 1971), Table 1, pp. 11-19.
5

The underlying annual indexes of gross domestic product at

constant factor costs, total and per capita, and of output in the
several sectors, particularly the A sector, are from Table 6b of
YNAS 1969, II and YNAS 1973, III.

The earlier volume is used to compute

quinquennial arithmetic means of the indexes for 1950-54, 1955-59,
and 1960-64, from which the growth rates for the first two quinquennial
spans are derived.

The later volume is used for 1960~64, 1965-69, and

1970-72, from which the growth rates

for the quinquennium 1960-1964

t::, 1965-69, and the four year period from mid-1965-69 to mid 1970-72

are derived.

The averages cited are the geometric means of the growth
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rates for the four intervals, with due regard to the shortness of the
last interval.
6

see United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign

Agricultural Economic Report, no. 98, The World Food Situation
Prospects to 1985, Washington, Dec. 1974), p. 12.

and

The classification

into the developing and developed groups is similar to that of the
United Nations, but nonmarket economies are included.

7
several of the points raised here have been discussed in
greater detail in my paper, "Problems in Comparing Recent Growth Rates
for Developed and Less-Developed Countries," Economic Development and
Cultural Change, vol. 20, no. 2, January 1972, pp. 185-209, reprinted
in Simon Kuznets, Population, Capital, and Growth: Selected Essays,
W.W. Norton (New York, 1973), pp. 311-342.

8

For the sources and procedure in calculating the·growth

rates see footnote 5.

9

For a convenient summary of the long-term population growth

estimates see United Nations, Background Paper for the Bucharest World
Population Conference, Demographic Trends in the World and its Major
Regions, 1950-1970
Table 1, p. 5.

E/Conf. 60/CBP/14 (April 1974, mimeographed),

The table shows world population estimates by John

Durand back to 1750, linking after 1900 with those of the United Nations.
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Footnote 9 (continued)
Although non-market economies are included, and the distinction between
less and more developed regions differs slightly from those used above,
the results would not be changed even with adjustment to our classifi
cation,

and exlusion of Communist countries.

lOA valuable collection of long-term series is found in
O. Andrew Collver, Birth Rates in Latin America: New Estimates of
Historical Trends and Fluctuations, Institue of International Studies,
University of California, Research Series no. 7 (Berkely 1965).

Two

monographs by Eduardo Arriaga, in the same research series, provide
valuable data and discussion on death rates and their declines.

They

are: New Life Tables for Latin American Populations in the Nineteenth
and Twentieth Centuries, Research Series no. 3 (Berkeley, 1968); and
Mortality Decline and Its Demographic Effects irt Latin America,
Research Series no. 6 (Berkeley, 1970).

11

see my paper, "Fertility Differentials between Less

Developed and Developed.Regions," to be published in Proceedings of
American Philosophical Society in late 1975.

12

Lest it be thought that continuation, for some time, of

high rates of population growth prove impossible because of physical
or technological limits, it should be noted that the United Nations
population projections do envisage such trends for the remainder of

45
Footnote 12 (continued)
this century.

Yet these projections of population volumes are

considered sustairtable--ba rring, of course, catastrophes of the nuclear
holocaust type--with declining death rates.

The brief explanations of

the assumptions in the two sources cited below clearly indicate the
implications, and the key roles particularly of those relating to the
modernization of the economic and social structures.
The magnitudes projected should be noted--using the "medium"
(of several) variants that can be viewed as more plausible than the
others.

In World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1968 (New York,

1973), the population of less developed regions (defined again to
include South Asia, Africa and Latin America), which grew at the rate
of 2.8 percent per year in 1965-70,would keep growing at roughly the same rate
to 1985 , and then the rate would gradually decline to 2.2 percent by the
.

end of the century.

For the developed regions (defined to include

Europe, excluding Eastern Europe; North America; Japan; and AustraliaNew Zealand), the growth rate for 1965-70 of close to 1 percent would
remain at that level to 1985, and then decline to 0.8 percent by the
end of the century.

The stability, at high levels, of the growth rate

for the LDCs through 1985, is the result of a decline in birth rates
offset by an almost equal decline in crude death rates (e.g. for South
Asia a decline in birth rates from 44 per thousand in 1965-70 to
37 per thousand in 1980-85, almost matched by a decline in death rates
from 17 to 11 per thousand for the same two quinquennia, ibid.

Table

A.3.1, p. 68), with the further decline in birth rates outweighing the
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Footno te 12 (contin ued)
diminis hing decline in death rates.

For the DCs, the moveme nts of

crude birth and death rates are much slighte r,as is the change in the
absolu te level of the low rate of popula tion increas e.
In World Popula tion Prospe cts, 1970-20 00, as Assesse d in 1973,
working paper, mimeog raphed, ESA/P/W P/.53 (New York, March 1975),
the
1970 popula tion totals have been revised slightl y downwa rd, and so
have
been the project ed growth rates (due largely to unexpe ctedly sharp
decline s in fertili ty in the DCs, and failure of death rates to decline
as rapidly as projec ted earlie r).

Howeve r, the genera l pattern s of

persist ence of high growth rates in the LDCs through 1985, and only
modera te decline s therea fter, and the contra st between these levels
and
those for the DCs (at about half to a third of those for the LDCs)
remain (see e.g., Table 1.1, p. 12).
This brief sunnnary of UN popula tion projec tions indicat es
that, even with substa ntial advance in modern ization , a_real istic
progno sis sugges ts continu ation of high rates of popula tion growth
in
the LDCs, peaking in the decade 1975-85 but remain ing at fairly high
levels to the end of the century , and exceed ing the popula tion growth
rates in the DCs by wide margin s.

The possib le consequ ence for the

differe nce in growth rates of per capita produc t between the LDCs
and
the DCs, and the possib le persist ence and widenin g of the gap, is
clear.

